explanation, and about ontological commitment more generally. One might therefore worryas I do-that many problems in philosophy of mind are actually psuedoproblems introduced by an outdated notion of theories.
Philosophy of mind has seen some important moves beyond the axiomatic view and the corresponding view of explanation in recent years (Craver (2007) is a notable example). I think, however, that philosophy of mind -and especially the metaphysics of mind -has not fully appreciated how different the landscape looks when one moves away from the old view of theories. The new wave in philosophy of mind will involve re-importing some of these lessons from philosophy of science, and re-thinking some of the old puzzles that arose in the context of the axiomatic theory. What follows is a first step in that process, focusing on the key issue of explanation and ontological commitment.
2
Two Views about Explanation
Explanatory Literalism
Consider the following pairs of explanations:
(1) (a) The square peg failed to pass through the hole because its cross-section was longer than the diameter of the hole Many have the strong intuition that the first sentence in each pair is a better explanation that the second. This is true, note, even though the truth of the second sentence guarantees the truth of the first. I want to take that intuition for granted and explore two different stories about why that might be the case.
There is a well-loved account, tracing at least back to Hilary Putnam, for the superiority of some explanations. Explanation 1a, Putnam claimed, is clearly better because
In this explanation certain relevant structural features of the situation are brought out. The geometrical features are brought out. It is relevant that a square one inch high is bigger than a circle one inch around. And the relationship between the size and shape of the peg and the size and the shape of the holes is relevant. It is relevant that both the board and the peg are rigid under transportation. And nothing else is relevant. The same explanation will go in any world (whatever the microstructure) in which these higher-level structural features are present. In that sense this explanation is autonomous (Putnam, 1975, p296) comfort to nonreductive physicalists. The fact that (4b) is inferior to (4a) suggests that even were psychology to be reduced to neuroscience, the resulting neural explanations would be inferior to the psychological ones because they would no longer refer to the most commensurate high-level properties. Further, the explanatory superiority of proportionate properties might lead us to suppose that we have a solution to the hoary causal exclusion argument. The causal exclusion argument says, in simplified terms, that mental and physical properties must (if distinct) compete for causal influence, and that a plausible physicalism should force us to assign causal priority to the physical one. Not so, literalism responds: both properties are causally relevant, but only the higher-level one counts as the cause. It does so because it is more proportionate, or commensurate with, or otherwise better fitted to the effect. Not only is the exclusion argument avoided, but the mental is given a certain causal priority over the physical. Nonreductive physicalism is saved. For this reason, various forms of literalism are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience.
Finally, literalism is simply assumed as uncontroversial by many philosophers of mind.
The alternatives to literalism seem to be some sort of anti-naturalism or scientific anti-realism, neither of which are particularly attractive. That alone seems to be reason to accept it.
Explanatory Agnosticism
Literalism is not the only account of explanatory goodness available to the naturalist, however. For each pair above, it is possible to account for the superiority of one of the explanations by appealing to facts about the language in which the explanations are couched while remaining provisionally neutral about the ontology one is thereby committed to. Call this agnosticism about explanatory goodness. The agnostic denies that we can move easily from language to ontology. Crudely put, the fact that a certain predicate appears in a superior explanation is no reason to believe that there is a property corresponding to that predicate.
I want to defend agnosticism about higher-level properties. Note that the position I favor is properly agnostic, rather than skeptical. I don't want to take a stand on whether there are higher-level properties (or determinables, or whatever). Maybe there are. Maybe there aren't. Rather, my claim is that in ordinary and scientific explanation, apparent reference to higher-level properties carries demands no ontological commitment to the existence of such
properties. There may well be higher-level causes; I just don't think that our best explanations are a good guide to what they are.
Agnosticism also has a certain prima facie plausibility. First, many have noted that shifts in the presumed interests of a listener can make a difference in the explanations that it is appropriate to give (van Fraassen, 1980) . Consider the explanation:
(5) Socrates died because he angered the Athenians
In certain contexts (historical/political ones say), explanation (5) is superior to either (3a) or (3b); in other contexts (physiological/medical ones), the reverse is true. Yet presumably the facts about what properties are involved and their commensurability remain unchanged.
A defense of agnosticism is strengthened by reflection on conversational pragmatics and their role in shaping our intuitions about explanations. We find the more general explanations of the pair more acceptable, says the agnostic, because of pragmatic constraints on the descriptive form of explanations (and not because they refer to more commensurate properties). These pragmatic constraints-and in particular, the Gricean maxims that underly cooperative conversation-may favor a more general description of the same circumstance, but that description is not superior because it picks out a more general property. 
The Plan
These above cases are not, to be sure, knockdown. The literalist has a ready response to them: he can say that the explanations cite facts that are causally relevant, and that shifts in context alter which causally relevant factors are appropriate to cite. But we should be suspicious of this: the evidence for literalism above was supposed to be our judgments about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of single explanations. That confidence should be undermined if we find serious context-sensitive effects on our judgments of appropriateness.
I think that agnosticism can be given a further defense. So the next section will give an extended argument in favor of agnosticism over literalism in the particular case of higher-level causal properties. The overall form of the argument is as follows: There is a set S of intuitions that favor the proportionality argument for higher-level causes. S is primarily constituted by our judgments about the examples at the beginning of section 2.1 and those like them. I claim that the pragmatics of explanation are such that we would have S regardless of whether there are higher-level causes or not. So the fact that we have S can't be part of an argument for higher-level causes.
Further, there are some more specific reasons to think that literalism itself is problematic. In particular, it is clear that there are certain predicates that are simply shorthand placeholders for functions defined in terms of other quantities. There are, I claim, good reason to treat such predicates as non-referring; even more strongly, there is no positive benefit to treating them as referring to properties. Yet literalism demands that we do so, which is a mark against literalism.
After the defense, I'll turn to diagnosis. Literalism, I'll argue, is plausible mainly because philosophers of mind are mostly wedded to a bad old sort of philosophy of science, one left over from the late positivists. I'll argue that the plausibility of literalism vanishes if we move to an updated philosophy of science. With that move, we in turn have new resources to deal with, and dissolve, philosophical puzzles that presuppose literalism.
Working psychologists, when faced with a good explanation, can still wonder whether it is ontologically committing. When we look at the sciences relevant to philosophy of mindpsychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience, at least-we find that there is often considerable debate about whether a term used in this or that explanation actually refers to a causal property. In a classic textbook on psychometrics, for example, Nunnally warns that It is not necessarily the case that all the terms used to describe people are matched by measurable attributes-e.g., ego strength, extrasensory perception, and dogmatism. Another possibility is that a measure may concern a mixture of attributes rather than only one attribute. This frequently occurs in questionnaire measures of "adjustment," which tend to contain items relating to a number of separable attributes. Although such conglomerate measures sometimes are partly justifiable on practical grounds, the use of such conglomerate measures offers a poor foundation for psychological science. (Nunnally, 1967, p.3) Consider the second possibility mentioned, that of 'conglomerate measures.' Some predicate P might have good predictive power, be measurable in straightforward ways, and appear in good explanations. Yet P may not correspond to a real property because it is simply a label that aggregates over several different psychological attributes. In short, P may be a derived quantity -a label for a function of other, more basic properties.
The problem of derived quantities has been overlooked by philosophers of mind because most of the explanations we tend to consider are toy examples that connect two simple events under ideal circumstances. The primary criterion for acceptability in simple explanations is simply that the explanans be described in the simplest, most informative way.
These simple re-descriptions look a lot like the attribution of higher-level properties, and that in turn goes a long way to explaining the plausibility of literalism. That plausibility vanishes when we move to more realistic scientific explanations. So I'd like to look in depth at a case from neuroscience to explain just why derived quantities are problematic for literalism.
The Problem for Literalism
The Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential has received renewed attention from philosophers of neuroscience. Hodgkin and Huxley showed that the changes in membrane potential of the neuron are determined by G N a and G k , functions that determine the sodium and potassium conductance, respectively, as a function of membrane potential. Briefly:
the membrane potential is a function of the differential concentrations of N a + and K + ions on either side of the neural membrane. The membrane is studded with channels that open at an overall rate dependent on the membrane potential; the opening and closing of these channels in turn changes the membrane potential by changing the relative concentration of those ions.
Hodgkin and Huxley's experimental determination of G N a and G k allows accurate derivation of the shape and amplitude of the action potential; it is a great triumph in that regard.
One thing that Hodgkin and Huxley's work explained was the fact that action potentials are threshold phenomena: membrane potential is stable below a certain threshold but rapidly depolarizes above it. We can explain this by noting that:
(6) Below the threshold membrane potential G N a /G k = 1, and so small depolarizations result in offsetting N a and K currents. Above the threshold, G N a /G k > 1, which results in a net N a current with positive feedback.
(6) is a testament to the explanatory fertility of the Hodgkin-Huxley model. Not only does it explain the threshold phenomena in action potentials, but implies a number of useful, testable, true counterfactuals (for example, that action potentials would not be generated if G N a /G k could be artificially pegged to ≤ 1, as it is by certain toxins.) Further, by parallel with explanations (1a) and (1b), it is arguably a better explanation than one that goes into the details of the opening of sodium channels, and for the same reason: it gives us precisely the information needed to explain the threshold and no more. Further, the details of the mechanism wouldn't add anything to (6)'s goodness. This is not because the details aren't causally important-they are-but rather because (6) has already told us all we need to know about those mechanisms. Like the other good explanations above, (6) implies precisely the right sorts of counterfactuals, in the right way, and so on. Suppose we do think that (6) explains why neurons fire in an all-or-nothing way. The literalist faces a dilemma. He could say that the expression 'G N a /G k ' does not itself designate a property-that it only stands for a mathematical operation defined over the determinate value of two distinct properties. But we could as a matter of convention introduce a singular term (say φ) to stand in for G N a /G k . φ would be a derived quantity. Since G N a /G k did not designate a property, φ should not either. But that is to concede the main claim of the agnostic view: that one cannot unproblematically move from the 3 Here, some care is needed. It has become recently fashionable to claim that the Hodgkin-Huxley equation does not explain anything, but merely describes the shape of the action potential (Craver, 2007, Ch3) . It is true that insofar as the above is explanatory, it is not because it constitutes a deduction from the more general laws postulated by Hodgkin and Huxley. Rather, (6) is explanatory because it details some facts about the mechanism that underlies the action potential, and then uses facts about that mechanism to explain the threshold. It does not detail the mechanisms by which the voltage-gated ion channels work; to the extent that the detailing of those mechanisms was part of neuroscientists' shared explanatory interests, Hodgkin and Huxley fell short of explaining everything there was to explain about the action potential. But that does not mean that the equations they experimentally derived were not themselves explanatory of some phenomena. Thanks to Carl Craver for helpful discussion on this point.
presence of a singular term to a causal property, even in our best explanations.
On the other hand, the literalist could say that G N a /G k designates a distinct, higherorder causal property. This is implausible for at least three reasons. First, it is an unnatural reading of (6) So either way the literalist treats G N a /G k , he must say that the quality of some explanations lies in how they describe a set of causal properties, not just that they describe causal properties. But that is to concede the agnostic's main point.
A Diagnosis
What's the lesson from all of this? One could, I suppose, use it to defend a crude sort of old-fashioned reductionism. That is, one could argue that all mental predicates are simply derived quantities, and that the only real causal properties are the physical ones and the properties that are identical to them. (Indeed, much of the above was inspired by Kim's remarks about second-order descriptions in science in chapter four of his (1998), and could be thought of as one way of unpacking them.) I think, though, that we can draw another, deeper conclusion. The real question is why literalism seems so plausible even if it's problematic, especially to naturalistically-minded philosophers of mind. Here, I think I can offer a diagnosis. 
Literalism and the Axiomatic View

The Semantic View of Theories
The axiomatic view is no longer popular among philosophers of science. It fell out of favor for a number of reasons. 5 Two in particular are worth noting. First, as Suppes notes, first--order formulations of theories are inadequate for many scientific purposes. Any theory that requires, say, the real numbers will be difficult to capture in first-order language. Further, axiomatizing both the theory and the accompanying math would be, in Suppes' words, "awkward and unduly laborious" (Suppes, 1967, p.58) . By this, I take it that Suppes means that even if we can axiomatize the relevant math, it would be inappropriate to include mathematical apparatuses in the theory itself-certainly it is more natural to describe set theory as something that we use to talk about various theories, not something that happens to be part of many distinct theories.
Second, the axiomatic view requires theories to be axiomatizable. Theories that can be axiomatized turn out to be rare, and theories that are actually treated as a set of axioms rarer still. This was bad enough in disciplines like biology and psychology, where it was hard to find things that counted as laws. But it seemed to be true even of physics: as van Fraassen notes, many useful treatments of quantum mechanics are non-axiomatic in form (1970) . Even if we are confident that theories could be identified with sets of axioms, then, it seems like a stretch to claim that the axiomatic view has captured how scientists treat theories.
From these criticisms, an alternative naturally follows. The semantic view of theories claims that theories are to be identified with sets of models, rather than sets of sentences.
These models are real structures-abstract entities like sets or state-spaces in Suppes and van
Fraassen, concrete objects in more recent treatments. 6 These structures are meant to be isomorphic to the world in some respect. Theoretical models are often described using language, but the important linkages hold between models and the world, not between any canonical description and the world. So on the semantic view, a theory consists of two parts: a set of models, and a postulation of isomorphism between certain respects of models and parts of the world.
The semantic view seems to fit better with scientific practice; many disciplines present models of some target phenomenon and then reason about them. This is most obvious in fields like cognitive psychology. Models of facial recognition, say, are never presented as sets of laws.
Instead, one is presented with a model mechanism and an assertion that this is what the brain does -that is, an assertion that the brain is isomorphic to the model in some respect. Similarly, as Lloyd has shown, many of the central claims of evolutionary theory can be interpreted as models of systems under selection (1994) . Newtonian mechanics can be interpreted as the postulation of certain models, the permissible Newtonian spaces (van Fraassen, 1970) . And so on.
The semantic view is problematic for literalism. On the semantic view, there is no presumption that the language in which theories are designated is at all important. The same set of models can be described using a variety of different terms, none of which need pick out the driving causal properties in a model (van Fraassen, 1989, Ch9) . As a simple example, Hodgkin and Huxley could be thought of as specifying a state-space for neural processes.
Later work on the molecular configuration of sodium and potassium channels described the same state-space using the language of molecular biology. Same models, same theory, completely different language. Again, literalism is unwarranted. Similarly, the relationship between model and world need not be exact: model-world mappings can be inexact, fuzzy, or otherwise complex (Godfrey-Smith, 2006) . So the mere fact that there is an element in a model does not warrant concluding that there is an isomorphic property or object in the world:
that depends, at the very least, on the intended model-world mapping.
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In addition to fitting the apparent practice of science, the semantic view also provides a neat solution to the role of mathematics in science. Mathematics is something we use to
reason about the models. Mathematics is not a part of any theory, but is available to all. Thus, max m h as van Fraassen puts it, physics first sets up a framework of models and then, having done so, "The theoretical reasoning of the physicist is viewed as ordinary mathematical reasoning concerning this framework" (van Fraassen, 1970, p.338) .
With that in mind, consider, mathematically complex claims like the Hodgkin-Huxley equation, or mathematically complex expressions like the one describing G N a ,
where m and h themselves stand for complex exponential functions governing activation and inactivation of the sodium channel. It would be a mug's game to try to recast any of these in a first-order language. If you can't, then the received view forces you to treat things like ratios, products, and multi-variable embedded functions as causal properties. As we saw in section 3.2, this isn't a very plausible reading of explanations like (6). Further, recasting (6) this way would be a futile exercise: you can keep your ontology trim by including only the individual properties in (6) along with math.
Once we move to a view on which scientific theories are not artificially hampered in their expressive power, something like agnosticism is forced upon us. On the received view, there is one best way to state the content of an explanation, because there are so few ways to express anything. On a semantic view, by contrast, one has the possibility of talking about models in a variety of different ways. When that happens, one will need to take pragmatic factors into account when we evaluate the goodness of explanations. Figuring out the ontological commitments of an explanation is a complicated, hermeneutic process, not a straightforward leap from terms to the world.
Going Further
Literalism ultimately relies on an unrealistically simple view about how scientific theories work. Attention to the pragmatic aspects of explanation shows several reasons why this simple view must be abandoned. Good explanations often involve abstract redescriptions of specific, lower-order properties; these re-descriptions are required for pragmatic reasons, not for ontological ones. This in turn fits well with the semantic view of theories, which carefully separates the language in which models are specified from the models themselves and the model-world relationships asserted by the theory. The semantic view of theories permits an alternative view of disciplinary individuation: what I'll call (with some trepidation) a paradigm-based view. Every discipline or sub-discipline starts with a set of characteristic phenomena that it tries to explain: living things for biology, minds for psychology, nerves for neuroscience, lenses for optics, and so on. The investigation of characteristic phenomena often hinges on creating local levelsagain, it's scientifically useful to abstract, to decompose, to divide things up by size, and to look at the behavior of aggregates and compounds. This is makes the standard level-based view of the world problematic, for two reasons. First, there's no guarantee that some sciences, when decomposing things into their parts won't run into another science that cares about aggregates (or vice versa). Often, these distinct subdisciplines bump into each other: seeking to explain the behavior of life, biologists decompose living things into cells, and cells into organelles, and organelles into their parts. At that point, it bumps into chemistry, which has been investigating the same phenomena as a special case of some more general abstract principles. That's not, note, due to some overarching commitment to a 'unity of science' program: this is normal science within one discipline extended until it-as a matter of contingent, empirical fact-hits normal science that started with a different set of characteristic phenomena. Sometimes when this happens there is a complete merger-as, for example, when the science of lenses came to be swallowed up to become a special branch of physics. Other times the merger is tentative or incomplete, as it currently is with biochemistry or cognitive neuroscience. These mergers should, in my opinion, be counted as forms of intertheoretic reduction. But note that the picture of reduction that emerges will not be an imperialistic one: there is not the science of one level of being co-opting a distinct one. Instead, insofar as disciplines evolve and merge, it is an outgrowth of perfectly ordinary intratheoretic endeavors on each side.
Second, many sciences care about making models at a relatively high level of abstraction. The same model of oscillatory motion turns out to be useful both for the investigation of springs and for the vibrations of electrons. Again, this is one of the things that physics is good at: taking the behavior of a specific set of things, and showing that at some level of abstraction it is the behavior of a diverse set of things. This sort of abstraction is, as I conceive of it, intra-theoretic: it is part of ordinary scientific practice within a discipline. But models formulated at that level of abstraction also often turn out to have unexpected uses in other domains: modeling (say) electrical circuits, or the oscillatory firing of neurons. In these cases, it's natural (and, note, actual) that models from one science get imported into another, largely unchanged. But this again makes problems for hierarchical concepts of nature.
In conclusion, the shift from an axiomatic to a semantic view of theories should result in a shift in how naturalistically-inclined philosophers approach scientific language. The very same theory can be couched in different language, and even canonical formulations of a theory can hide considerable complexity in the real-world properties to which a model corresponds.
Fodor was once able to write confidently that "Roughly, psychological states are what the terms in psychological theories denote if the theories are true." (Fodor, 1997, p.162 fn1) .
Moving to the semantic view of theories should sap that confidence. With new humility, however, also comes new opportunities for close reading of scientific theories, and a more engaged approach to determining the ontology to which psychological explanations actually commit us. Thanks to Carl Craver, David Hilbert, Esther Klein, Tom Polger, and several APA audiences for comments on previous drafts. Special thanks to participants in the New Waves online conference organized by Mark
Sprevak and Jesper Kallestrup for many helpful comments.
